My guest on the podcast today is Glen Arnold, author of The Deals of Warren Buffett.
Despite holding positions of Professor of Investment and Professor of Corporate Finance, Glen concluded that academic life was not nearly as much fun as making money in the markets. As a wealthy investor in his fifties, he now spends most of his time running his equity portfolio from an office in the heart of rural Leicestershire.
In his new book, Glen explains Buffett’s thinking behind his first investment deals and shows how his cumulative returns compounded his wealth over time.
If you want to understand more about the investment philosophy of Warren Buffett and how he got started as arguably the world’s greatest investor, this conversation is for you.
Here’s my conversation with Glen Arnold, author of The Deals of Warren Buffett, in episode 300 of Informed Choice Radio.
Martin: Well welcome back to Informed Choice Radio. I’m delighted today to welcome Glen Arnold, who is author of a new book called The Deals of Warren Buffett: Volume One, The First $100 Million. So Glen, welcome to the podcast.
Glen: Well thank you Martin. It’s a pleasure to be here. Thank you for inviting me.
Martin: No, it’s a pleasure; I’m very excited to have a chat about this subject. It’s one I’m very interested in. Can we start a bit with you before we move on to Warren Buffett? You concluded that academic life wasn’t as much fun as making money in the market, so how did that realisation come about?
Glen: Well, I just thought it would be more fun. I was toddling along as an academic; I had a chair at university. And things were going fine, but I just thought, well I didn’t really want to spend the next 20 years doing much the same thing writing academic papers for a small bunch of people. So I thought it’d be much more interesting to actually take my own money and actually see if I could emulate Warren Buffett in many ways, and use the knowledge that I’d picked up from doing a number of academic studies on stock market efficiency, with a number of my Ph.D. students, basically trying to discover methods of investing which a robust vigorous analysis showed actually worked.
And I’d done quite a bit of teach of this sort of thing in the City of London as well. So I thought well, instead of being the guy that always taught other people what they should be doing, I thought, well, why don’t you actually do it yourself? So I got on with it.
Martin: And the positions you held, it was professor of investments and professor of corporate finance. You mentioned there academic studies around stock market efficiency, so what were the sorts of things you were looking at within those roles?
Glen: Well there for example, one of my Ph.D. students and I published a paper on Benjamin Graham’s net current asset value method of investing. We looked at U.K. shares, we went back 20-odd years and imagined that every [inaudible 00:02:01] we were buying those shares which met the criteria of Benjamin Graham, in particular that they have a share price which is below the net current asset value of the shares. So basically, you just look at the current assets, and you completely ignore all the fixed assets or the non-current assets, and from that current asset figure you minus all the liabilities. And if the result is a number greater than the current market capitalization of the firm, then it’s a buy.
So we basically did that, imagining going back in time and did it over and over again, and we averaged through time. And we published that in the Journal of Investing, and it showed that indeed, Benjamin Graham’s method does work oftentimes in U.K. shares. Basically he would have done very well out of that one.
So that’s one method. We also looked at return reversal; we looked at momentum; all sorts of different methods.
Martin: And I know, the big question you were exploring was what works in investment. So based on what you’ve just described, did you find a satisfactory answer to that question?
Glen: There’s no one single answer. The course that I taught at Schroders for a number of years in the City, went over a number of days and we had done a whole day on momentum, for example. And then a whole day on the size effect; you know, whether small firms outperform large firms. A whole day on return reversal. And so on. And then we’d have a series of days on the philosophies of various investors. And on, what is risk? What is the real risk? So, basically there we reject the wonderful Nobel Prize-winning theories such as capital asset pricing model and [inaudible 00:03:51] portfolio theory as a guide to a real-world investor.
So there’s all sorts of aspects, ways of looking at the stock market. So you get a coming together of behavioural finance stuff, there’s a lot on behavioural finance. You get all this evidence on what seems to have worked in the past in robust studies; what the great investors have done, and their outcomes; and then you’ve got behavioural finance on top of that. And you mix all that up together and you get an overall view of what works. And it’s no one thing; there are different methods, different styles that could adopt, and they would work. But we know other styles do not work.
So within the value school, for example, there are a number of different approaches that you could take. And pretty well all of them would work. But there are a number of other things that we’ve discovered that, you just wouldn’t do. So for instance, you wouldn’t be investing in Bitcoin at the moment.
Martin: No, no. So given there’s lots of right answers for different scenarios, different market conditions, et cetera, is the best approach the same for individual investors, or do individual investors have quirks? I guess this comes back to the behavioural finance overlay you talked about.
Glen: Yeah, you’ve got to play to your advantages. As an individual investor, you might have unique knowledge. Say you’ve been in the medical field, or engineering. You may have an advantage there in terms of your knowledge base. So you can analyse those companies far better than other people can.
And don’t forget, the City of London, they don’t analyse a lot of companies. You won’t find any analysis on companies that have got market caps of, I don’t know, less than 50 million, something like that. When I was at Schroders they told me they regard a small cap as something that’s got a market cap of more than 200 million. And I’m thinking, well, half the stock market is under 200 million. So there’s all sorts of advantages that you have as a small investor, to be able to go out and investigate a company in much more depth, to do real company analysis, compared to the guys in the City. So play to that advantage.
And then you’ve got to take into account the amount of time you’ve got available to do this sort of thing. So there are certain methods which are appropriate for somebody that’s only got a couple of hours a week or something like that. There are other methods which are more suitable for people that can spend, say, 30 hours a week looking at shares and analysing companies.
Martin: And personally now you’re spending a lot of your time running your own equity portfolio, so do you fall into that category of, four hours a week, or 30 hours a week? Or maybe some more?
Glen: 30 hour a week guy.
Martin: Yes, okay!
Glen: I did once say that I wasn’t going to write anymore books. But I’ve had to take a bit of time from share analysis to write books. Books keep cropping up so I keep on doing them. But I was supposed to be a 50 week an hour guy, but I’m now down to about 30 or 40.
Martin: Now, you mention the writing of the books and we’re talking today about your new book, The Deals of Warren Buffet: Volume One, the First $100 Million. Now, this is a man who’s worth an estimated $81 billion today. So I guess my first question about him is, why did it take him so long, relatively speaking, nearly 40 years, to get that first $100 million under his belt?
Glen: Because he followed sound investment principles. Sound investment principles won’t make you rich very, very fast. You’ve got to keep at it, and you accumulate that money over time.
He started with very little; it wasn’t as though he was born with a billion, like some of the other guys out there. You know, have had a very rich father, like, say Donald Trump or somebody like that. He actually started with only about $100.
So he had to build up his pot of money and he did that as a youngster, doing things like collecting golf balls that had been lost in ponds, renting out pinball machines in barbershops. Bought a Rolls-Royce and rented that out. Did all sorts of things just to make his initial pot of money. So he had less than $10,000 as a teenager, for example. Even though he worked extremely hard to get that money. So starting off with that small amount of money.
The real big breakthrough for him was after [inaudible 00:08:22] with Graham for a couple of years he went back to Omaha, and five other investors put money into a fund, it was just only $100,000 in total, just over $100,000. And the rule was that he would invest an he wouldn’t charge anything unless he got a minimum of 4%. In other words, what those people could earn putting into a bank account. So he said he didn’t deserve to earn anything; this is a lesson for modern day fund managers: you don’t deserve to earn anything, charge any fee at all unless you get a minimum that people could otherwise get in a bank account.
But after that, anything he earned above that he got 25% of. And because he performed so well, and because new people were attracted towards his investment partnerships, he got 25% of anything above, it changed to about 6%. So sometimes it was 4%, sometimes it was 6%, as his threshold leve at which he wouldn’t get paid anything. But he got 25% of anything above that. So eventually he was earning hundreds of thousands, millions of dollars from that.
Martin: It’s a very savvy approach, back then I guess, to be charging a performance fee like many modern hedge funds do today with that sort of hurdle rate in place. So he was ahead of his time in that respect.
Glen: Well hedge funds, no; I condemn the hedge funds.
Glen: The hedge funds will charge you 2% regardless of performance. That is so different to charging zero if you don’t perform at least at a minimum threshold.
Glen: So, the hedge funds get you both ways. The hedge funds will get you even if the markets are going down, they’re performing extremely badly. They will still charge you 2%. And they can live off 2%. You’ve got a bigwig in a hedge fund, you know, those guys are walking with a lot of money. 20 million? Every year, regardless of what they do. And they get 20% on that point, in those periods where they are outperforming, which could be down to pure luck by the way, they get 20% as well.
Martin: It’s a very different approach isn’t it? So, he was in this club, almost, of investors, of his $100,000 to get him started. What were some of his first deals? Where did he invest?
Glen: Oh, he searched for small companies that he could really understand, really thoroughly understand, often local to where he was based, which was in Omaha. Far from Wall Street, far from where everybody else was analysing companies. So there’s quite a few interesting examples around that time.
There’s one called Rockwood, well actually that was before that time, that was when he was based in New York when he was working with Benjamin Graham for a little while. And he had a nice little thing with chocolate chips that you put in cookies, making these. And this other very smart guy had taken over this company, and was buying in the shares. And he was buying in the shares not by handing out money for the shares, but by handing out equivalent bags of chocolate chips. Cocoa rather than the chips though. And Benjamin Graham’s company was taking these receipts to receive all this cocoa, and then selling them on the futures market, and there was an arbitrage thing going on. Well Warren thought no, it was much better, this was a very smart guy, and he’s selling or swapping this cocoa for a relatively low price for the shares; it’s much better to be with him and actually to invest in shares in that cocoa company, in the chocolate chip company.
So he made quite a fortune on that one. Another one is Dempster Mill. This is one when he did go back to Omaha. And there’s a town called Beatrix, which is a few miles away from Omaha. And this company had agricultural machinery, and the farmers would go along and buy their agricultural stuff, irrigation things that they needed from this company. It had various branches all over Nebraska. And anyway, the share price was extremely low because it kept on making losses. So Warren bought into the company, took a controlling stake and became chairman of this company. And for months he would go along for board meetings and say look guys, you’ve got far too much investment in things like inventory, far too much here. I want to reduce that money. And they’d say oh yes, yes, yes, yes. That’s fine, no problem. We’ll reduce it. And they never did. So in the end, it was a friend of his, Johnny Munger, who later became a partner in about halfway, suggested a guy who would go in there and really knock heads together and made that a profitable business, and Warren doubled his money on that one.
So a lot of these early investments, he didn’t do any more than sort of 50%, doubling sometimes, you know, only 10% returns. But cumulatively, all this added up over a long period of time.
Martin: But in that last example, I guess that’s what we’d call today an “activist investor.” Was that a common approach at the time, for people to take a controlling stake and try and turn the business around?
Glen: Exactly. Exactly, he had to be an activist investor there. So yes, he needed a manager that he could trust, and this is one of the lessons he learned quite early on: he needed a key person there who would do his bidding. And his logic is, each dollar that’s invested in anything has to generate a satisfactory rate of return. So he’d see all that inventory sitting around there, it just wasn’t earning a dollar. It was, you know, making losses still and yet they had all this money tied up and he knew that he could use that money somewhere else much more effectively.
There’s another, about the same time, there’s an example of Sandborn Maps. Which is a terrific example, because Sandborn Maps created maps for insurance companies. So if you had a fire or something, you knew exactly the values, you knew exactly where to put fire hoses and all this sort of thing. Anyway, so quite specialised maps, for all the cities in the United States. They’re actually still in existence. But anyway, the company had become quite tired. The insurance companies held quite a large stake in Sanborn Maps. And the old directors were not really interested in running things efficiently, for various reasons. Warren bought up a whole load of shares in this, and his friends would buy, so Warren had about 20% and his friends had about 20%. So anyway, he got himself onto the board eventually, and tried to persuade them to sell their share portfolios, because they’d had all this cash and all these shares just sitting there doing nothing and the directors, they were quite content just carrying on as they were.
So he had to join the board and had to take over, and he eventually persuaded the rest of the board to sell the shares, and he made more than doubling on Sanborn Maps. So yes it was very much that sort of deep analysis of something that you’re going to go into, and then, in his case, intervening like that.
Having said that, these are the sort of highlight deals that he made. There would have been at the same time, lots of other smaller investments, you know, where he buys just 1 or 2% of a company. He’d be diversified across the stock market. Not across the stock market; you don’t need to diversify more than to about 10 different shares to be liquidly diversified.
Martin: So, those companies did very, very well, his sort of standout investments. Did he have any standout failures from that time, or was it all pretty much plain sailing?
Glen: Well, no, no, no, there were plenty of failures. One example is, he put money into a gasoline station in Omaha. And even on a Saturday did some physical work; he actually went there and served at the counter selling gasoline. But it was located right opposite a Texaco station, which was very well positioned and respected by the community. Had good bargaining power, buying power. And of course they got slaughtered.
So that taught Warren a lot about economic franchise. You’ve got to have that strong economic franchise if you want to succeed in a business. So, one of the things he looks for today is whether a company’s got that strong economic, some degree of pricing power. You know, are people willing to pay a little bit extra because, or are you going to attract more people because you’re in a better position? Are people willing to pay a little bit extra because of the image that you project? So Coca-Cola for example projects a particular image, and people seem to be willing to pay an awful lot more for a Coca-Cola can than another can that doesn’t have “Coca-Cola” written on it.
And the same with candy, the same with, the Washington Post for example. You know, people are willing to pay that much extra because of the quality name behind it. And that allows you to generate high rates of return on capital employed.
Martin: And you mentioned Sanborn Maps is still in existence today. Are any of the early investments he made from this stage of his career still in his portfolio today?
Glen: Yes they are actually. One of the very earliest, when he was 20 years old, he was a student at Columbia Business School. You had Benjamin Graham taught at, he started teaching in the 1930s and he was still teaching in 1950, called “Security Analysis.” And Warren Buffet was very keen on getting there. Anyway, he went to college; he was the only one to ever get an A+ from Benjamin Graham, by the way. He noticed that Benjamin Graham’s fund had shares in another company called GEICO. That is short for Government Employees Insurance Company, G-E-I-C-O. And this day in 1950, on a Saturday, he gets on a train and goes from New York to Washington to GEICO’s headquarters. And he knocks on the door, and the janitor opens the door on a Saturday. And Warren says, “Is there anybody I can talk to about insurance? I’ve been analysing this company because Benjamin Graham’s invested in it and I’m really interested. Can I talk to somebody?” And it so happened that the finance director was upstairs. So the finance director very generously, a chap called Lorimer Davidson, becomes great friends with Warren later, meets this 20-year-old who looks like a 17-year-old geek and agree to answer a couple of questions for a few minutes.
Because of the intelligence of Warren Buffett’s question, they end up talking for four hours. And Warren invests something like two-thirds of the money that he has. He had about $15,000 at this stage; he manage to save that. So he invests $10,000 in GEICO shares. About a year later he sells them for $15,000. So he make about 50%. So he doesn’t hold it for a while, but then in the early 1970s the company runs into real trouble.
And he pulls out the logic; he actually a wrote a piece for a magazine at that time about this company, saying why is this a good company, and what he was looking for was the quality of the economic franchise. Even at the age of 20. So he figured that it had a very low cost distribution model with captive customers. So it was government employees, who were low risk on insurance, and you had a way of contacting them through the telephone, which was low risk. So you had a list of people, easy, cheap to contact, and they hardly ever had accidents. Great. At that time, telephone selling for insurance was quite a revolutionary idea. So it had a real good method. But it was a tiny, tiny insurance company, and most of Wall Street completely ignored it.
And it carried on like that; you grew a bit, and then they had a massive expansion in the early 1970s, and it didn’t work out. With insurance, you can go mad; you can generate new business, fine, but you generate new business by having very low premium rates. And low premium rates, it’ll catch you up one day, because you’ll end up with a whole load of accidents, and people will start claiming more off you than what you actually collected in premiums. And that’s exactly what happened to it.
It was almost bust, and then by this stage Warren Buffett is very wealthy. He runs Berkshire Hathaway, and it’s got hundreds of millions to invest. So they invest some of that money in GEICO again. And GEICO now forms the backbone, it’s worth billions, absolutely, I would imagine tens if not hundreds of billions; maybe 100 billion, something like that, GEICO. Very big insurance company in the States. It does a lot of car insurance but more importantly it does a lot of reinsurance, where they collect a lot of money in, long before they actually have to pay it out. So they do long risk. So for example, hurricane risk. So, year after year they’re collecting insurance premiums and there is a hurricane, say three years down the line. That gives Warren a big pot of money to invest. And it’s the foundation for a lot of his success in business, that he has these floats, what we call “floats”; he’s bought into various companies that have floats. Insurance is a really, really good one, where you collect money from people first; you can invest that in the stock market; and then you pay out sometimes many years later.
Another one is the stamp business. In the 1970s, you could get what in this country are Green Shield Stamps. In America they are Blue Chip Stamps. They bought into a company in the early 1970s which gave sold these stamps, basically, to say, petrol stations, who would then hand them out to customers. And again, that was a form of float, because the petrol station would pay for the stamps up front, and then the customer would then go along to the Blue Chip Stamp company and collect a toaster. Once they had collected enough stamps in their book, they could go and swap them for a toaster or something like that. And that’s another big float of money which Warren could then invest elsewhere.
And he put most of that money, or a lot of that money, into See’s Candy, which is a fantastic investment. Absolutely brilliant; he paid $25 million for a company that so far, this is one that he still holds, so far has given him $2 billion. So $25 million in, $2 billion so far. At the moment it makes about $100 million a year profit. So it’s continuing to give him. So something that cost 25 is now getting $100 million per year to invest elsewhere.
Martin: So that sounds to me like a sort of key attribute of what he looks for in his investments, is cash generation and the ability to take that and invest elsewhere?
Glen: Absolutely. Yes. Yes, he must have … It all comes back to rates of return on capital employed. Now once you’ve got that rate of return on capital employed, you then decide whether to reinvest within that same business, and it not necessarily comes back to you, back to the centre. So for example you’ve got the electricity companies that he owns, and at the moment they’re investing a fantastic amount into renewable energy. So they’re putting up loads of wind turbines over the Western states. So that money, he would like it to come back to the centre, but if there’s a case that can be made for investing it within the business, great. If that’s going to generate a high rate of return there. So even with GEICO for example, that does generate high rates of return, and a lot of it does flow to him, but there’s a big push on the market of that at the moment, and they’re taking big market shares in insurance in the United States, car insurance. So it can leave it within that.
But with something like See’s Candy, it was decided very, very early on not to open any more shops basically. They did try a few experiments, but they started off in 1972 with something like 200 shops, and even today they’ve only got about 200 shops. Okay? Because the logic there was, See’s Candy was in the minds of Californians, and the few states around California. See’s Candy is a premium product, and it’s the sort of thing you give on Valentine’s Day. Right? It’s that sort of level of gift. You don’t want to give cheap chocolates on Valentine’s Day. So they can charge extra. So there’s good margins on See’s Candy in that area. But if you try and sell See’s Candy in, I don’t know, Texas or New York, it’s not in people’s mind as a premium product. And they tried it in some of the Midwestern states; it just didn’t take off.
They’ve got a few additional outlets now, but even after 40 years of owning See’s Candy, they’ve hardly expanded the business at all. So it’s just pumped out money instead. And the reason is because the marginal return on capital employed for each additional shop is not good enough. It’s fantastic where they are, but it’s not good there. Now how many managers do you know, that would say, “Right lads, we’re going to stop at candy. Because we’re not going to generates the rates of return that we require for our shareholders.” But if you get somebody like Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger come along, and act like owners, and discuss this with the managers, and say “Look, I don’t think it’s logical for you to expand. You shouldn’t go international. You shouldn’t go even national, because the rates of return on capital employed won’t be good enough.”
That’s the advantage of being somebody who is very familiar with business, analyses businesses, and understands the soft elements of business. And the soft elements are things like what’s in people’s mind. What’s in the customer’s mind? So instead of things like market share, Warren refers to “mind share.” So, things like Coca-Cola. Disney, for example, mind share. What you’ve got there, is, I think they still hold shares in Disney. I’m pretty sure, I think they do. I can’t remember. But anyway, you take Disney as a franchise. They’ve certainly held shares in Disney for a long, long time. What you’ve got there is, it’s in people’s mind that Disney as a brand, and all its individual characters are brands in people’s mind, and people will, generation after generation, go back to those brands and pay for movies, for downloads, whatever, to watch that [inaudible 00:28:22]. So it’s Snow White and Seven Dwarves; you don’t have to pay any more money to manufacture Snow White and Seven Dwarves. It’s already there, and it’s already in people’s mind; you don’t have to create a new character and spend $1 billion trying to get that into people’s minds around the world. It’s already there and you can keep using it. So having that mind share is really valuable.
Martin: So really powerful assets, I guess, to have there. Now, thinking about Warren Buffett today, as I said worth about $81 billion, do you think for private investors who look at Warren and admire what he does, it’s better to look back to the early stage of his career and learn lessons from that? Or should we try and emulate what he does today as a very wealthy investor, one of the wealthiest men in the planet?
Glen: Yeah. I mean there’s common roots to both what he did back then and what he does now. And the common route is that he’s an investor not a speculator. Now to be an investor, you’ve got to do three things. One is you’ve got to study what you’re investing into. So if you’re investing into shares, you thoroughly understand the business. So, analyse business. So imagine if you were buying a corner shop. You’d be fascinated by things like the accounting. You’d really want to know the profits that they made, the assets that they have, the liabilities that they have. You’d really be fascinated by things like length of the lease, and whether there’s any competitors down the road. So you’d want to do some sort of competitor analysis. Does it have a strong economic franchise? Is it in an isolated spot and there’s nobody else around to compete within, and it’s got some sort of barrier to entry to its area, I don’t know why, but it might have some sort of barrier to competition coming along.
So that sort of understanding both the quantitative and the qualitative understanding of the business. The other aspect of that by the way is the quality of the people running it. So you really want to understand that. Quality of those people, and whether it’s nice and stable. So that’s the main elements of understanding a business.
Secondly, build in a margin of safety. So if you analyse something, you reckon that that company is worth 100 million pounds to 150 million pounds; these things are never precise. You would not be buying into that company at say, 100 million. You’d want a good margin of safety, you’d be buying in at about 80. You wait until it falls to 80; if it never does you move on to other companies. Or just keep it on your watch list; maybe one day it will come to.
And the third thing is, don’t try and stretch yourself to gain extraordinary returns, aiming for extraordinary returns. That leads you into all sorts of problems such as, you borrow to try and get those fantastic returns; you take ridiculous risks by investing in particular instruments that are extremely risky, highly geared instruments. Don’t stretch yourself down.
So that’s the common root. Now he started off in Benjamin Graham’s school of thought almost exclusively. So he was looking particularly at the balance sheet. So things like net current asset value investing. That was the big thing that he was looking at. So companies that were kind of down on their luck in terms of profits, but had all these wonderful assets that you would expect that one day things would come right.
And he would also invest in other small companies that were more towards quality economic franchise. And he got increasingly biassed in that way. It doesn’t mean that he abandoned the more balance sheet type focus, that he had learned with Benjamin Graham. But, he had two strings to his bow, if you like. But it’s still those same basic principles, understand what you’re buying into, margin of safety, don’t take extreme risks to try and achieve extraordinary returns. And understanding that Mr. Market is often a fool. You should not take your reference in terms of what you think is valuable from Mr. Market.
And then he sort of evolved again in more recent years, where he’s got to invest billions almost every time. Hundreds of millions is just too small. He’s investing way over 100 billion; he’s got to allocate tens of billions every year, somewhere. He can’t really invest in these small companies, the net current asset value investing companies. We can still do that. Us smaller investors can still do that. So we have actually a broader spectrum of types of investment that we can go for, than Warren does.
Martin: It’s nice to hear that; it’s nice to hear that smaller investors, we have an advantage over the great Warren Buffet.
Glen: Yes! If we focus on, and really understand something, we have an advantage.
Martin: Yep. Glen, thank you so much for your time today. Thank you for coming on the podcast. Before you go, where can we buy a copy of the book and how can we connect with you online?
Glen: Well, the book’s everywhere, but Amazon obviously. All the internet book sites have it. All over the world, apparently. Connect with me online, oh I didn’t intent to write this book in the first place. It came out of …
Glen: Out of my newsletters. When I left university, I started doing these, well I didn’t; I’d started writing a blog, just for myself, just to write down my thoughts, so I could put it out. My wife set up this website for me, so I just put it out there. And anyway, investment website ADBFN contacted me, and said would you put them on our website; people will then subscribe. So I started doing that. And people do subscribe to it. And when I was analysing companies and putting those up, in between, I thought well I’ve got to do something else as well, so I started writing sort of the life story of Warren Buffet in terms of his deals.
Long story short, I have a newsletter site at ADBFN; it’s called Deep Value Shares. So it describes what I’m investing in, or selling, and why I’m doing it, and various other aspects of investment. And I’m going to start writing the second book in the series, of Warren Buffet’s deals, and I shall put it up for my newsletter subscribers first, and then eventually it’ll end up in a book.
Martin: Glen, thank you so much; we’ll make sure we put links in the show notes for this episode so our listeners can find the books and find the newsletter easily. But thank you for your time.
Glen: Okay well thank you very much. Very enjoyable.